

Consensus Statement

World Association of Veterinary Dermatology

Recommendations for approaches to methicillin-resistant staphylococcal infections of small animals: Diagnosis, therapeutic considerations, and preventative measures

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Consensus Statements
<i>Staphylococcus pseudintermedius</i> , <i>S. schleiferi</i> (including the coagulase-negative variant), and <i>S. aureus</i> are the primary pathogens encountered in small animal dermatologic practice. Clinical isolates of all three species commonly express methicillin resistance and multi-drug resistance.
In addition, several other species of coagulase-negative <i>Staphylococcus</i> (CoNS) have been reported to cause skin and soft tissue infections, and the pathogenic role of a CoNS must be deduced by the clinician on a case-by-case basis.
The pathogenic potential of any CoNS isolate obtained from a secondary skin lesion or a contaminated body site should be interpreted in light of the clinical disease process (urgency, co-morbidities, risk for adverse reactions to specific antibacterial drugs) and with respect to any other pathogenic species of bacteria that may be co-isolated with it.
Minimum reporting by microbiology laboratories should include complete speciation of staphylococci – regardless of tube coagulase status – and a complete antibiogram.
Topical therapy, using antibacterial agents and biocides with proven anti-staphylococcal efficacy, is the recommended treatment modality for any surface or superficial pyoderma involving MRS; particularly those with localized lesions, and for otitis and superficial wound infections.
Topical therapy should be used as the sole on-animal antibacterial treatment for surface and superficial infections whenever the pet and owner can be expected to be compliant.
Geographical differences exist in the availability and licensure of antimicrobial drugs for use in animals. Judicious use decisions need to take into account regional prescribing recommendations in veterinary and human medicine.
Empirical drug selection for systemic therapy is always contraindicated when a methicillin-resistant <i>Staphylococcus</i> (MRS) infection is suspected based on historical factors, due to the high prevalence of multiple drug resistance within these strains..
A restriction-of-use policy is recommended for use of glycopeptides (vancomycin, teicoplanin, telavancin), linezolid (oxazolidinon), anti-MRSA cephalosporins and potentially new compounds that may be approved in the future for treatment of multi-drug resistant pathogens of people.
There is little evidence for a difference in outcome between MRS and methicillin-susceptible <i>Staphylococcus</i> infections in animals, and that the prognosis for MRS skin infections in pets is good, depending on the underlying cause and co-morbidities.
There is currently not enough evidence to recommend routine decolonization of MRS carrier animals.
Molecular strain typing methods are research tools used to investigate the epidemiology and ecology of MRS. However, the clinical value of strain typing largely depends on the organism's population structure, the typing method(s) used, and the goals of the investigation. Strain typing often has no impact on patient- or clinic-level management, even in the context of most outbreaks.
In contemporary veterinary practices, routine cleaning and disinfection protocols are the cornerstone of hospital infection control. MRS are susceptible to commonly used disinfectants. Protocols should be designed to reduce or eliminate pathogenic burdens in the environment and on equipment. These protocols must be communicated clearly (and often) to the hospital team and practiced correctly and consistently.
Hand hygiene (proper washing/drying and use of alcohol-based hand sanitizers) is the main-stay of personal responsibility for infection control. No data exist regarding optimal personal protective equipment (PPE) practices for handling animals infected with MRS. However, the use of some degree of enhanced precautions to reduce contamination of clothing and skin is reasonable. Typically, this would consist of a gown or dedicated laboratory coat, and gloves.
Transmission of MRS by infected pets to other individuals in the home or community is known to occur, but data to guide recommendations are incomplete. In lieu of such data, it is reasonable to restrict animals from contact situations until treatment has started and a clinical response is evident. In the home, this could include social distancing from 'at risk' individuals and enhanced hygienic measures for the occupants and the environment.
Screening of clinically normal animals for carriage of MRS – regardless of the setting – rarely leads to clear and justifiable actions. Screening of humans leads to issues of confidentiality, and testing of clinic personnel (especially if not clearly voluntary and anonymous) could lead to a host of legal problems for clinic management. Testing of healthy individuals, particularly humans, should be a rare event that is based on a specific need and with a clear plan to act on the results.

1 **Introduction:**

2 Since the inception of antimicrobial drug use in the practice of modern
3 medicine, staphylococci have evolved in response to the presence of antimicrobial
4 drugs in biological systems. This evolution has included the *de novo* development or
5 acquisition of antimicrobial drug resistance mechanisms, and the amplification and
6 proliferation of epidemiologically successful strains of pathogenic staphylococci
7 across human and animal populations. Currently, some degree of antimicrobial
8 resistance has been documented within all *Staphylococcus* species that infect
9 humans and domestic animals.^{1,2} Pan-susceptible strains within any given species
10 still exist, but have become uncommon in clinical practice.^{3,4} Even staphylococci of
11 low pathogenic potential (e.g. most coagulase-negative staphylococci) may harbor
12 resistance determinants and serve as reservoirs for their transmission to species of
13 greater pathogenic potential.⁵ Collectively, the genus *Staphylococcus* is known to
14 harbor resistance mechanisms to all antimicrobials that are available in clinical
15 practice.⁶⁻⁹

16 In human medicine, methicillin resistance in *Staphylococcus aureus* has
17 contributed to the medical and economic burdens associated with skin and soft tissue
18 infections since the early 1960's.¹⁰ In veterinary medicine, methicillin resistance has
19 been recognized as a serious and widespread problem within the past decade,
20 during which time its prevalence within populations of the *Staphylococcus* spp of
21 greatest clinical importance to dogs and cats, namely *S. pseudintermedius*, *S. aureus*
22 and *S. schleiferi*, has escalated rapidly.^{3,4,11,12}

23 The term "skin and soft tissue infection" (SSTI) is used commonly in human
24 medicine to describe an inflammatory response to microbial invasion of the
25 epidermis, dermis, or subcutaneous tissues.¹³ Although staphylococci are the most
26 common cause of human SSTI, the term is not limited to staphylococcal infections. In
27 dogs and cats, the terms superficial and deep pyoderma are used more commonly,
28 and infection by a *Staphylococcus* spp is implied unless otherwise stated. Guidelines
29 for the approach to treatment of SSTI of people were published in 2005¹⁴ and
30 updated in 2014.¹⁵ The Infectious Diseases Society of America has also published
31 guidelines for the treatment of human methicillin-resistant *S. aureus* (MRSA)
32 infections, including SSTI, bacteremia and endocarditis, and infections of bone,
33 joints, and the central nervous system.¹⁶ While instructive to veterinarians, these
34 guidelines do not address many of the nuances relevant to small animal veterinary
35 practice. Guidelines for the treatment of canine pyoderma in general,¹⁷ and for canine
36 superficial bacterial folliculitis in particular,¹⁸ have been published, but there are no
37 comprehensive guidelines available regarding management of canine or feline SSTI
38 caused by methicillin-resistant staphylococci (MRS). This document presents
39 consensus statements regarding the laboratory diagnosis, transmission dynamics,
40 and environmental mitigation of MRS, and provides management recommendations
41 for cases of SSTI shown to be caused by them.

42 **Methicillin resistance and multi-drug resistance:**

43 Methicillin is a semi-synthetic, penicillinase-resistant penicillin that was
44 developed to circumvent penicillin resistance mediated by staphylococcal
45 penicillinases. Penicillinases are bacterial enzymes that deactivate both natural
46 penicillins (penicillin G and V) and aminopenicillins (e.g. ampicillin and amoxicillin) by
47 breaking the core structure of these β -lactam antibiotics. Shortly after the introduction
48 of methicillin in human medicine, *S. aureus* developed resistance to it by acquisition
49 of *mecA*, a gene encoding a specific penicillin-binding proteins (PBP2a) with low
50

51 affinity to all β -lactams, including cephalosporins.²⁰ Even if methicillin is no longer
52 used in clinical practice, the term “methicillin-resistant” has persisted after the
53 discovery of cephalosporins in the 1970s to indicate strains that are resistant to all
54 beta-lactams except the newest generation of cephalosporins specifically developed
55 for treatment of MRSA (e.g. ceftaroline). MRS may express co-resistance to any
56 combination of other drug classes, including aminoglycosides, fluoroquinolones,
57 lincosamides, macrolides, tetracyclines, potentiated sulfonamides, chloramphenicol,
58 and rifampicin.⁷ When a MRS strain expresses co-resistance to at least two
59 additional antimicrobial classes, it may be referred to as multi-drug resistant (MDR),
60 and the term extensively drug resistant (XDR) may be used if the strain is non-
61 susceptible to all but two or fewer antimicrobial classes.²¹ Both MDR and XDR
62 strains have emerged worldwide amongst clinical MRS isolates from dogs and cats.²²

63 **Staphylococcal colonization:**

64 Bacteria of the genus *Staphylococcus* are Gram-positive, facultatively
65 anaerobic cocci that exist as part of the normal cutaneous and mucosal microbiota of
66 mammals and birds. Most animals will be colonized by one or more *Staphylococcus*
67 spp, with particular body sites being predisposed to colonization by certain
68 staphylococcal species.^{23,24} The origins of colonizing strains likely vary over a
69 lifetime, but the first opportunity for acquisition occurs at the time of birth. It is known
70 that puppies are colonized by maternal staphylococcal flora during the neonatal
71 period,²⁵ and often maintain the strain transferred from the dam for many months
72 after they are separated.²⁶ As adults, it may not be uncommon for dogs to harbor two
73 or more genetically unrelated strains of *S. pseudintermedius* simultaneously but at
74 different body sites.²⁷ The mouth appears to be the most consistent site for
75 staphylococcal carriage in dogs and cats, followed by the perineum.²³ Co-carriage
76 with multiple species of staphylococci at the same time, including pathogenic
77 species, also is possible.^{23, 28-30} Furthermore, a study of the complete microbiome
78 present at putative staphylococcal carriage sites has suggested that feline nasal
79 carriage of staphylococci is consistent with that carried by the humans in their
80 households.³¹

81
82 Colonization implies that a bacterial population is self-sustaining for an
83 extended period of time in the absence of disease. The term “carriage” is commonly
84 used in a generic sense, when colonization has not been confirmed by longitudinal
85 sampling of the animal. It may also be used to imply that a bacterial population is not
86 biologically self-sustaining, but could be mechanically transmitted by its temporary
87 host or from an environmental reservoir.^{32,33} Human nasal carriage of *S. aureus* may
88 be classified as “persistent” or intermittent” as defined by the nasal “culture rule”,
89 where persistence is reliably predicted by two positive nasal swabs collected at a
90 one-week interval, from which a minimum number of colony-forming units is
91 derived.³⁴ Such a rule has not been established for dogs or cats, and it appears that
92 the nares might not be the most predictive site for sampling of dogs.^{23,27}

93 In some cases, colonization by a particular staphylococcal species or strain
94 may be short-lived, if a more dominant strain proliferates, out-competes, and
95 displaces the original strain from its niche.³⁵ One example would be decimation of a
96 colonizing staphylococcal population by an antimicrobial drug, and re-colonization by
97 a strain that is resistant to that drug. It is widely believed that this is the mechanism
98 by which MRS spread laterally across human and animal populations, and
99 epidemiological evidence supports this assumption.^{36,37}

100

101 **Staphylococcal pathogenicity and virulence:**

102 Several *Staphylococcus* species serve dual roles as commensals and
103 opportunistic pathogens, and are capable of causing serious infections of the skin
104 and many other tissues.³⁸⁻⁴⁰ When cutaneous or systemic disease disrupts the skin's
105 surface defense mechanisms, skin infection (bacterial pyoderma) or otitis externa
106 may result. In the case of canine superficial bacterial folliculitis, infection is typically
107 caused by the same strain of *Staphylococcus* that is present at carriage sites.⁴¹
108 Invasive staphylococcal infections of deeper soft tissue planes, the genitourinary
109 tract, respiratory tract, central nervous system, joints, bone, and body cavities may
110 also result either from ascension along epithelial tracts, introduction via penetrating
111 wounds, or through hematogenous spread.

112 The potential for pathogenicity is determined primarily by the arsenal of
113 virulence factors expressed by any given *Staphylococcus* strain. An excellent review
114 of staphylococcal virulence is provided by Rosenstein and Gotz⁵. Virulence factors
115 may include expression of adhesins by which the bacterium binds to cells and
116 extracellular matrix, formation of biofilm which protects the bacterium from the
117 immune response, production of toxins (which may include cytolytic, exfoliative,
118 enterotoxigenic, and superantigenic toxins), and expression of factors which assist in
119 evasion of the host's immune response.^{5,42} Of the latter, it is the ability to coagulate
120 plasma *in vitro*—mediated by either a coagulase protein (produced by the *coa* gene)
121 or a von Willebrand factor-binding protein—which is best known to clinicians as an
122 indicator of pathogenic potential. Production of a coagulase factor promotes
123 formation of a fibrin clot scaffold for tissue invasion, is associated with abscess
124 formation, and protects staphylococcal microcolonies (*in vitro*) against
125 neutrophils.^{43,44} It should be noted that genetic expression of antimicrobial resistance
126 is not a true virulence factor, i.e. a resistant strain is not necessarily more virulent
127 than a susceptible one.

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129

130 ***Staphylococcus* species of relevance to veterinary medicine**

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132 **Coagulase-positive staphylococci (CoPS):**

133 In veterinary medicine, it is the CoPS that cause the great majority of SSTIs.
134 Historically, *S. intermedius* was the first CoPS recognized to be distinct from *S.*
135 *aureus* in the mid-1970's. It was isolated from pigeons, dogs, mink and horses, and
136 the species name derived from the investigator's observation that the biochemical
137 characteristics of this new species were "intermediate" between those of *S. aureus*
138 and *S. epidermidis*.⁴⁵ *S. intermedius* was subsequently identified as the major CoPS
139 commensal and pathogen of dogs,⁴⁶ and many other domestic animal species. More
140 recently however, the phylogenetic structure and nomenclature of *S. intermedius* has
141 changed due to advances in molecular characterization.^{47,48} The *S. intermedius*
142 group (SIG) is now comprised of 3 genetically demonstrable species: *S. intermedius*,
143 *S. pseudintermedius*, and *S. delphini*, each of which occupy distinct ecological
144 niches.⁴⁷ Of this group, the primary canine and feline pathogen is now known to be
145 *S. pseudintermedius*.^{49,50} This consensus document therefore uses the current
146 nomenclature while recognizing that the older scientific literature (prior to 2007)
147 references the primary canine and feline pathogen as *S. intermedius*.

148 The CoPS which may colonize the skin of the domestic dogs and cats have
149 been well characterized, and include *S. pseudintermedius* and *S. aureus*.^{23,27,29,30,51-53}
150 *S. pseudintermedius* clearly dominates on dogs whereas in cats, studies differ on

151 whether *S. pseudintermedius* or *S. aureus* is carried most frequently.^{29,54-57} It
152 appears that the prevalence of *S. aureus* on canine and feline carriage sites is more
153 common when these pets live with a person who has been recently diagnosed with
154 MRSA infection.²³ *S. schleiferi*, a coagulase-variable species, has rarely been
155 isolated from the healthy skin of either dogs or cats in cross-sectional studies of skin
156 and mucous membrane carriage,^{23,29,30} yet it is commonly isolated from skin and ear
157 canal infections of dogs with histories of prior antimicrobial exposures.^{39,58-60}

158 These three staphylococcal species cause the overwhelming majority of SSTI
159 in dogs and cats,^{3,4} and isolation of any one of them from a clinical sample should
160 warrant careful consideration of the animal's need for antimicrobial therapy based on
161 history and clinical signs. Anecdotally, another coagulase-variable species, *S. hyicus*,
162 has occasionally been isolated from healthy cats²⁹ and from pyogenic infections of
163 small animals,⁶¹ although it is primarily known to veterinarians as the most common
164 etiologic agent associated with porcine exudative epidermitis¹ ("greasy pig disease").
165

166 **Coagulase-negative staphylococci (CoNS):**

167 It is critical to note that *S. schleiferi* is a coagulase-variable species, currently
168 classified as being comprised of two sub-species: *S. schleiferi* subsp *coagulans*
169 (coagulase-positive) and *S. schleiferi* subsp *schleiferi* (coagulase-negative).
170 However, recent genotypic and epidemiological studies have shown that these two
171 subspecies are not genotypically distinct,^{62,63} nor do they differ in their pathogenic
172 effects.³⁹ This fact has led to a paradigm shift in the way veterinary microbiology
173 laboratories must report culture and susceptibility results for CoNS (see below). The
174 CoNS species *S. lugdenensis*, *S. haemolyticus*, and *S. epidermidis* have also been
175 isolated from pyogenic infections of small animals, albeit rarely.^{61,64}

176 Although CoNS have traditionally been considered to be non-pathogenic
177 resident or transient commensals in animals, this viewpoint is likely oversimplified
178 and in human medicine CoNS are known to be pathogenic in many settings.⁶⁵⁻⁶⁹ This
179 is in part due to the increasing prevalence of immunosuppression within the human
180 population and use of invasive medical instruments, which have allowed greater
181 susceptibility and exposure to less pathogenic organisms on a population-wide
182 basis.⁶⁸ To compound the problem, CoNS commonly express MR and often even
183 MDR,^{70,71} and colonization with MR-CoNS is not uncommon in healthy and diseased
184 individuals. However, with the exception of *S. saprophyticus* as a cause of urinary
185 tract infections that arise outside of the healthcare setting, human infection by CoNS
186 remains largely a hospital-associated problem in compromised hosts.⁶⁸

187 In veterinary medicine, where most CoNS are still thought to be minimally
188 pathogenic,⁶⁴ a common question posed by clinicians is what should be done when a
189 lab reports that a CoNS has been isolated from a clinical sample. The consensus of
190 this working group is that this interpretation should largely depend on how confident
191 the clinician is that the "true" etiologic agent has been isolated. Coagulase-negative
192 *S. schleiferi* should generally be considered pathogenic when isolated from inflamed
193 tissue or a pyogenic fluid.^{39,58,59} In the case of other CoNS species, the solution is
194 much less clear. In general, if the culture sample was obtained from a "sterile" site
195 using good aseptic technique (e.g., joint fluid, blood, CSF, closed body cavity,
196 cystocentesis), or was collected from an intact primary skin lesion (pustule, bulla,
197 non-draining abscess) and another more pathogenic bacterium was not also
198 identified, the authors recommend that treatment may be considered and
199 antimicrobials chosen (if needed) based upon susceptibility results. The microbiology
200 laboratory may also be helpful to the clinician in making this assessment, based upon

201 the number of colony-forming units isolated from the sample. If the specimen was
202 obtained from a contaminated site (such as the skin or ear canal surface, an open
203 wound, the upper respiratory tract or oral cavity) the result should be interpreted with
204 caution. In these cases, the clinician should consider repeating the culture, especially
205 if extensive MDR presents a therapeutic dilemma and if the patient's health will not
206 be compromised by waiting for additional test results. When a CoNS is isolated from
207 a clinical sample as part of a mixed population of bacteria, consideration must be
208 given to the composite antibiogram of these organisms and deference paid to any
209 organisms known to have greater pathogenic potential. When conflicts of drug choice
210 arise, antimicrobial therapy should be targeted toward the organism of greatest
211 pathogenic potential.

212

213 **Methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus* (MRSA)**

214 Since the early 1960's, the prevalence of methicillin resistance in *S. aureus*
215 has escalated in many countries and MRSA is a common cause of hospital-
216 associated infections of people throughout the world.⁷² During the mid-1990's,
217 MRSA strains which cause SSTI in people with no known nosocomial risk factors
218 arose *de novo* within the community.^{72,73} These strains originally exhibited more
219 favorable antimicrobial susceptibility profiles than hospital-associated strains, but
220 express more virulence factors, such as the Panton-Valentine leucocidin toxin
221 gene.^{74,75} However, a progressive trend toward multiple drug resistance has now
222 been documented.⁶ Risk factors associated with transmission of MRSA within the
223 community include crowded living conditions, shared bathing facilities, and
224 participation in contact sports.³³ Over the past decade, niche drift has occurred, with
225 the archetypal hospital strains "escaping" into community circulation, while
226 community-onset strains have become endemic in some hospitals as nosocomial
227 pathogens.^{72,76}

228 Overall, isolation of MRSA from small animal infections remains rare
229 compared to MRSP and MRSS, with some geographical differences (*a table listing*
230 *published reports will to be added at the time of first revision*). In North America and
231 Europe, the dominant strain types of MRSA that are carried by (and infect) dogs and
232 cats appear to reflect the prevalence of lineages successful within the human
233 population in the particular region or country.^{42,77-79} Unfortunately, these often are the
234 strains that express the most extensive MDR. The true prevalence of MRSA
235 infections in domestic pets within the community is difficult to estimate, as reports
236 have been hospital-based and national population-based surveillance is not
237 performed in pets. An excellent review of the genomic structure and epidemiology of
238 veterinary-sourced MRSA strains is available.⁷⁹

239

240 **Methicillin-resistant *S. pseudintermedius* (MRSP):**

241 Over the past decade, MRSP has emerged as a clinically important pathogen
242 which causes treatment-resistant infections of dogs and cats.^{3,4,37,80} Like HA-MRSA
243 strains, most MRSP isolates co-express resistance to several other classes of
244 antimicrobials, such as the fluoroquinolones, macrolides, tetracyclines, and
245 aminoglycosides.^{3,4} Currently, it is common to isolate MRSP that is susceptible to
246 very few antimicrobials, with susceptibility only to amikacin, rifampin, vancomycin
247 and linezolid being a widely encountered pattern. This type of antibiogram presents a
248 true therapeutic dilemma, due both to potential for drug toxicities (amikacin and
249 rifampin) and ethical use considerations (vancomycin and linezolid).

250 Because MRSA evolved with a clonal population structure and global
251 dissemination of specific clones occurred through the years, it was hypothesized that
252 MRSP isolates would also be highly clonal. Studies of the population genetic
253 structure of *S. pseudintermedius* infection isolates obtained from animals in North
254 America, Europe and Japan have indeed proven them to be highly clonal.⁴⁷ Two
255 major clonal lineages have disseminated throughout Europe [Sequence Type (ST)
256 71], North America (ST 68), and Japan (ST 71), and other less common clonal
257 lineages may be emerging.^{50,81} Sequencing of the *mecA* gene has revealed a high
258 degree of homology (95-100%) with the *mecA* gene of *S. aureus*, suggesting
259 horizontal transfer of the gene or acquisition from a common source (e.g. CoNS).⁴⁷
260 The structure of the MRSP phylogenetic tree suggests that the *mecA* gene has been
261 received by this staphylococcal species on multiple occasions and on several
262 different continents.⁴⁷

263 **Methicillin-resistant *S. schleiferi* (MRSS):**

264 In humans, *S. schleiferi* infections appear to be rare. The coagulase-negative
265 variant of *S. schleiferi* is most commonly associated with disease, causing primarily
266 post-surgical skin and soft-tissue infections, while reports of infection by the
267 coagulase-positive subspecies remains very rare (reviewed by Cain).⁸² In dogs, both
268 subspecies are commonly associated with skin and ear canal infections, and
269 statistically associated with prior antimicrobial use or recurrent pyoderma.^{39,58}
270 Isolation of *S. schleiferi* from pyogenic infections of cats remains exceedingly rare.^{3,29}
271 While both subspecies have been isolated from the healthy skin and ear canals of
272 dogs, this remains a rare finding, and the true natural reservoir for *S. schleiferi*
273 remains in question (although it is likely the dog).^{23,29,30} The prevalence of MR in *S.*
274 *schleiferi* clinical isolates is high, and reported to exceed 50% within two veterinary
275 teaching hospitals in the USA.^{39,83}

276 Not unlike MRSA and MRSP, methicillin-resistant *S. schleiferi* is evolving
277 within a clonal population structure. A limited number of strain types, as defined by
278 pulsed field gel electrophoresis, were identified in a collection of 161 clinical isolates
279 that were submitted to a clinical microbiology lab in the USA between 2003 and
280 2007.³⁹ In a follow-up report from the same laboratory, it was noted that the
281 population had undergone further periodic selection (reduction of dominant strain
282 types) to three major clonal groups, during the period of 2008 and 2013.⁸⁴ A global
283 survey and comparison of *S. schleiferi* strain types has not been reported.

284 For more detailed information on these three MRS pathogens, the reader is
285 referred to several excellent reviews on the topic.^{7,40,79,83} Table 1 provides a summary
286 of recent studies evaluating the prevalence of MRS and methicillin-susceptible
287 staphylococci among dogs and/or cats in hospital and community settings. These
288 data suggest potential regional, temporal, and host species and contextual
289 differences in animal carriage rates.

290 **Laboratory identification of MRS:**

291 *S. pseudintermedius* has traditionally been distinguished from *S. aureus* based on
292 colony appearance on blood agar and phenotypic tests.⁴⁰ Phenotypic identification of
293 *S. pseudintermedius* has been complicated by the recent taxonomic changes, since
294 this species cannot be easily distinguished from the other members of the SIG, *S.*
295 *intermedius* and *S. delphini*, on the basis of simple and readily available phenotypic
296 tests.⁴⁰ Molecular diagnostic methods based on polymerase chain reaction (PCR)
297 are recommended for accurate species identification of coagulase-positive
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300 staphylococci, including *S. schleiferi* subsp. *coagulans*.⁸⁵ Proteomic mass
301 spectrometry (MALDI-TOF or matrix-assisted laser desorption/ionization time-of-
302 flight) is a valuable cost-effective, rapid and highly accurate alternative to PCR,
303 provided the database has been refined by strict quality control protocols.^{86,87} The
304 great limitation of this technology is the very high up-front cost of purchasing a
305 MALDI-TOF instrument, which implies a high throughput work load to amortize the
306 costs. MALDI-TOF mass spectrometry can be used to identify any bacterial species,
307 including CoNS, provided that the database has been validated for the species of
308 interest. This condition may explain the discrepancies between the studies that have
309 assessed the suitability of this technology for species differentiation within the
310 SIG.^{86,87} Indeed, a significant improvement of the SIG identification score values was
311 achieved in one of the studies by refining the original database provided by the
312 manufacturer of one of the two MALDI-TOF instruments available in the market.⁸⁸

313 PCR amplification of the methicillin resistance gene *mecA* or commercial
314 agglutination tests designed to detect its gene product (penicillin-binding protein 2a,
315 PBP 2a or PBP 2') are presently regarded as the gold standards for identification of
316 methicillin resistance.⁸⁹ One of these two methods should be used to confirm
317 presumed MRSA, MRSP or MRSS detected by oxacillin or ceftiofur susceptibility
318 testing.⁹⁰ The ceftiofur minimum inhibitory concentration (MIC) is a poorer predictor
319 of methicillin resistance than the disk diffusion test for staphylococci other than *S.*
320 *aureus*.⁹¹ While for *S. aureus* the ceftiofur disk test is equivalent to oxacillin MIC test,
321 the use of ceftiofur as a surrogate for MRSP detection by disk diffusion is
322 controversial⁹²⁻⁹⁴ and not recommended currently by Clinical Laboratory Standards
323 Institute (CLSI). This controversy may be explained by differences in media used in
324 the different studies and should be investigated further. Strains that are
325 oxacillin/ceftiofur-resistant and *mecA*-positive or PBP 2a-producing should be
326 reported as resistant to all penicillins, cephalosporins (except anti-MRSA
327 cephalosporins), carbapenems and cepheems regardless of the *in vitro* susceptibility
328 test results obtained with these agents.⁹⁰ This so called "expert rule" was originally
329 established for MRSA to minimize very major errors of antimicrobial susceptibility
330 testing (i.e. resistant strains reported as susceptible) since MRSA infections generally
331 respond poorly to β -lactam therapy, even though MRSA strains may display *in vitro*
332 susceptibility and could erroneously be reported as susceptible to β -lactam agents.
333 The latter phenomenon is due to poor *in vitro* expression of *mecA* in the presence of
334 β -lactams other than oxacillin and ceftiofur, which are used as surrogate drugs for
335 this reason. It should be noted that this expert rule has never been validated for
336 MRSP and MRS other than *S. aureus* and *S. lugdunensis*, which display significantly
337 lower oxacillin MICs compared to the two latter species. This difference is reflected in
338 the oxacillin resistance breakpoints for *S. aureus/S. lugdunensis* (>2 μ g/mL) versus all
339 other *Staphylococcus* spp. (>0.25 μ g/mL).⁹¹

341 **Therapeutic considerations for MRS infections:**

343 **Topical therapy:**

344 Topical therapy, using antibacterial agents with proven anti-staphylococcal
345 efficacy, is the recommended treatment modality for any surface and superficial
346 pyoderma involving MRS, particularly those with localized lesions, and for otitis and
347 superficial wound infection. The skin is easily accessible by topical treatment and
348 antimicrobial formulations for use in small animals are available in most countries. A
349 systematic review of topical therapy for canine skin infections concluded that

350 evidence from randomized controlled trials was sparse on topical treatments but that
351 good evidence supported the use of chlorhexidine and to a lesser extent of benzoyl
352 peroxide in bacterial skin infections.⁹⁵ This review had included studies on canine
353 pyoderma irrespective of methicillin-resistance amongst staphylococcal pathogens
354 and an extrapolation of results is therefore limited. However, minimum inhibitory
355 concentrations (MICs) reported for MRSA isolates from pets in North America, Europe
356 and Asia have so far remained low, likely to be exceeded by drug concentrations
357 achievable with topical application. Amongst the almost 200 MRSA included in recent
358 *in vitro* studies, low MICs were found for chlorhexidine ($\leq 16 \mu\text{g/mL}$), miconazole (≤ 2
359 $\mu\text{g/mL}$), fusidic acid ($\leq 2 \mu\text{g/mL}$), mupirocin ($\leq 0.5 \mu\text{g/mL}$) and polymyxin B (≤ 4
360 $\mu\text{g/mL}$); only one isolate in a collection of 49 showed and MIC of $16 \mu\text{g/mL}$ to fusidic
361 acid.⁹⁶⁻¹⁰⁰ In the three studies that included MRSA isolates from pets, MICs were at
362 least one dilution higher than for MRSA with individual outliers of MICs exceeding
363 $256 \mu\text{g/mL}$ fusidic acid (6 of 102 isolates).⁹⁶⁻⁹⁸

364 Topical therapy should be used as the sole on-animal antibacterial treatment
365 for surface and superficial infections whenever a pet and owner can be expected to
366 be compliant. Although dermatology texts still recommend systemic antimicrobial
367 therapy for superficial pyoderma with or without added topical medication, this
368 recommendation can be challenged at times of increasing antimicrobial resistance.
369 Newer studies have provided evidence that topical therapy as the sole antibacterial
370 treatment can be effective in superficial pyoderma, providing opportunity to reduce
371 the need for systemic therapy in some cases. Chlorhexidine and benzoyl peroxide
372 shampoos, resolved or substantially improved clinical signs within three weeks in the
373 majority of dogs with MSSA superficial pyoderma.^{101,102} Similarly, good response to
374 topical therapy alone and no adverse effects were reported in 19/28 dogs with MRSA
375 pyoderma and in all 14 dogs with MRSA pyoderma treated topically in other case
376 series.^{80,101,102} Furthermore, the efficacy of a twice weekly chlorhexidine shampoo
377 combined with daily chlorhexidine spray was shown to be comparable to oral
378 amoxicillin-clavulanate in a recently published four-week comparative study in 51
379 dogs.¹⁰³

380 While the argument in favor of topical antibacterial therapy is convincing, the
381 choice of drug, particularly in creams, gels and ointments, is more complicated.
382 Geographical differences in availability and authorization for different species exist.
383 and in view of the potential for transmission of staphylococci between humans and
384 animals, antimicrobial choices for treatment of animals need to take into account
385 regional prescribing recommendations in veterinary and human medicine. Concern
386 over resistance to fusidic acid, mupirocin and chlorhexidine exists and resistance
387 genes and increasing MICs in staphylococcal isolates have been described in
388 isolates from humans and animals.^{98, 104-107} However, the clinical relevance of
389 currently known resistance markers and of higher MICs remains unclear for topical
390 drug application and clinical treatment failure of topical anti-staphylococcal therapy
391 has not been conclusively reported, to the knowledge of this committee.

392 Fusidic acid is included in different topical formulations (gels, ophthalmics,
393 otics) and approved for use in dogs in several European countries and in Canada but
394 not, for example, in the U.S. It is also available as an anti-staphylococcal ointment for
395 use in humans in Europe, Canada, Australia and countries in Asia, but also not in the
396 U.S., and is available for systemic use in humans on both continents. In contrast,
397 mupirocin is approved as an antibacterial ointment formulation in the U.S. for use in
398 dogs but in most European countries only for use in humans as treatment of bacterial
399 skin infections and as the most frequently prescribed antibiotic for MRSA

400 decolonization.¹⁰⁸ In the UK, the British National Formulary recommends that
401 mupirocin should be reserved for the eradication of nasal MRSA carriage in hospital
402 patients and staff.¹⁰⁹ Mupirocin is not used systemically so that *in vitro* resistances
403 may be less relevant as high drug concentrations are likely to be achieved at the site
404 of infection or at carriage sites. In fact, previous treatment failures could so far be
405 linked to environmental contamination or vector transmission, although caution
406 should be used.¹⁰⁴ For fusidic acid though, topical therapy has been associated with
407 the emergence of strains showing high fusidic acid MICs and which may therefore fail
408 to respond to systemic treatment in humans.¹¹⁰ These differences in use and
409 licensing between countries is unfortunate at a time when intercontinental travel of
410 people, pets and their staphylococci continues to increase. However, while
411 discussion should be encouraged in this area, only products approved for the
412 respective species in each country should be used in the interest of patient safety.

413 Despite the absence of reports on clinical treatment failure of topical anti-
414 staphylococcal treatment so far, monitoring of MICs, clinical efficacy and further
415 evaluation of topical treatment alternatives^{111,112} such as hypochlorite (bleach),
416 Manuka honey and of synergistic combinations is warranted.^{113,114} For MRS
417 infections involving biofilm producing strains (for example, around lip folds or
418 implants), additional measures to improve efficacy of topical antibacterial agents may
419 be needed. In addition, constant vigilance of owner compliance is indicated.

420

421 **Systemic therapy:**

422 For deep pyoderma and for widespread or severe superficial infections and in
423 animals that are not amenable to topical therapy, systemic treatment is indicated.
424 Basic principles of responsible use of antibacterial drugs apply to MRS as for any
425 other bacterial infections. For comprehensive information on treatment of canine
426 staphylococcal skin infections, irrespective of methicillin-resistance, readers are
427 referred to two recently published guideline documents, both available online with
428 free open access. While MRS infections are mentioned, they are not specifically
429 discussed. One document, authored by a group of veterinary dermatologists,
430 addresses diagnosis and treatment of canine bacterial skin infections and classifies
431 drugs into first and second-line antibiotics.^{17,115} The other represents a consensus by
432 members of the Antimicrobial Guidelines Working Group of the International Society
433 for Companion Animal Infectious Disease (ISCAID), focuses on management
434 specifically of superficial bacterial folliculitis and groups antimicrobial drugs into first
435 and second tier categories.¹⁸ Both include discussion of empirical and culture-based
436 drug choices, adverse effects and dosage recommendations for antimicrobial drugs.

437 Efficacy of systemic antibacterial therapy for MRS infections depends
438 predominantly on susceptibility of the organism but will also be determined by correct
439 drug administration including accurate dosing, owner compliance and clinical
440 variables such as severity of disease and causative and concurrent diseases. Due to
441 the extensive multidrug-resistance associated with all MRS, treatment choices for
442 systemic therapy are substantially limited. Information from a recently published
443 systematic review of evidence for systemic antimicrobial treatments in superficial and
444 deep pyoderma are not applicable as no known MRS were included in the reviewed
445 studies.¹¹⁶

446 Susceptibility test results should always be available to make treatment
447 decisions once MRS have been identified. However, if MRS is only suspected, for
448 example following previous infections or based on cytological evidence of infection
449 after antimicrobial therapy, a careful, susceptibility test-based approach is indicated to

450 ensure best use of the remaining effective agents. This applies even though trends of
451 susceptibilities may be known in some regions – at least for the most successfully
452 spreading lineages. For example, for the treatment of the currently dominant human
453 health-care associated MRSA CC22 which is also the MRS lineage most frequently
454 isolated from pets in the US and the UK, tetracyclines and trimethoprim-potentiated
455 sulfonamides remain good treatment choices based on *in vitro* data and clinical case
456 reports.¹¹⁷ Amongst MRSSc, susceptibility to tetracyclines and trimethoprim-
457 potentiated sulfonamides had remained in over 80% of isolates as shown in large
458 retrospective studies.^{3,39} For MRSP though, individual susceptibilities are infrequent
459 and unpredictable.^{3,81,118} In fact, molecular studies have shown that the presence of
460 individual resistance genes can vary even on a single mobile genetic element and
461 within the same lineages.^{79,119}

462 Amongst antimicrobials for which *in vitro* testing has shown susceptibility of a
463 particular isolate, the choice will be based on clinical characteristics. No single drug
464 has been shown to be better than another in a recent Cochrane review on antibiotic
465 treatment of MRSA wounds in humans.¹²⁰ Since identification of MRS requires
466 laboratory testing, at least a routine susceptibility profile should always be available
467 with each isolate. If this initial report includes susceptibilities to drugs that are
468 available and licensed for the species, these should be considered first. Additionally,
469 preference should be given to agents with a narrow anti-staphylococcal spectrum to
470 considerations of safety and patient-characteristics such as previous adverse drug
471 reactions, concurrent disease, practicalities in dosing and cost as for other drugs.
472 Specific points to consider for licensed drugs in the context of MRS are:

- 473 • Beta-lactam antibiotics should not be used for MRS infections, irrespective of
474 the susceptibility report.⁹⁰ Although third generation cephalosporins have a
475 broader spectrum of efficacy than first generation cephalosporins, they do not
476 have efficacy against MRS as shown for cefovecin¹²¹ and cefpodoxime.¹²²
- 477 • Care is needed when interpreting clindamycin susceptibility as inducible
478 resistance has been reported in MRSA and MRSP associated with certain
479 sequence types¹²³ Erythromycin-clindamycin-D-zone testing is recommended
480 prior to treatment to avoid treatment failure, particularly with MRSA.^{124L}
- 481 • Resistance to the tetracyclines is mediated by four different genes, and the
482 genes most commonly expressed by *S. pseudintermedius* are *tet(M)* and
483 *tet(K)*. Strains which possess only *tet(K)* maintain susceptibility to minocycline
484 but not to other tetracyclines. The newly approved canine breakpoints for
485 doxycycline¹²⁵ are a reasonable surrogate for minocycline susceptibility.¹²⁶
486 Tetracycline may be used as a surrogate for testing susceptibility to
487 doxycycline, but canine specific MIC or disc-diffusion breakpoints should be
488 used.¹²⁵
- 489 • Where possible, fluoroquinolones should be avoided for empirical therapy
490 when an MRS is suspected. For the first-generation fluoroquinolones in
491 particular, the disparity in resistance rates between MRSP and methicillin-
492 susceptible *S. pseudintermedius* (MSSP) is striking,³ and fluoroquinolones
493 have been identified as a major driver for methicillin-resistance in
494 staphylococci.¹²⁷ However, this risk needs to be balanced for each patient with
495 the safety profiles of the other drugs available according to the antibiogram.

496
497 When no susceptibilities to clinically relevant, routinely used and licensed
498 antimicrobials are reported, extended resistance testing needs to be requested from

499 the laboratory. Agents then to be considered and for which some information on
500 treatment of canine MRS infections is published.^{128,129}
501 It is important to remember though, that the majority of antimicrobial drugs mentioned
502 here are listed as critically important antimicrobials (CIA) for human medicine in the
503 most recent, third revision of the WHO Advisory Group on Integrated Surveillance of
504 Antimicrobial Resistance (AGISAR).¹³⁰ This does not just apply for drugs which are
505 agents not widely approved for veterinary use. Even those approved in many
506 countries for use in pets such as amoxicillin, the fluoroquinolones and the third
507 generation cephalosporins (cefovecin, cefpodoxime) are classified as CIA. (Table 2)
508 Of the antimicrobial agents frequently used in small animal practice, only first
509 generation cephalosporins (e.g. cephalexin, cefadroxil), clindamycin and lincomycin,
510 fusidic acid, the tetracyclines and sulfonamides are included in the second category
511 of highly important for human medicine.

512 For the glycopeptides (vancomycin, teicoplanin, telavancin), linezolid
513 (oxazolidinone) and potentially new compounds in the future, this group of authors
514 recommends implementation of a restriction-of-use protocol as already in place at
515 one of the authors' institution.¹³¹ Briefly, prescriptions would be considered
516 appropriate after discussion with a specialist experienced in treatment of infectious
517 diseases, after it could be shown that the patient's infection requires systemic
518 therapy, is life-threatening but with a reasonable chance for survival following
519 treatment and when *in vitro* susceptibility had been shown for the relevant pathogen
520 without other treatment options available based on susceptibility testing and patient's
521 medical circumstances. Glycopeptides and linezolid are drugs indicated in human
522 medicine for the treatment of serious infections due to Gram positive bacteria (e.g.
523 peritonitis in peritoneal dialysis patients, endocarditis) or for surgical prophylaxis if
524 there is a high risk of MRSA. Vancomycin and teicoplanin given orally (poor enteric
525 absorption) are further used in the treatment of *Clostridium difficile* infection.
526 Recently, increasing vancomycin resistance amongst enterococci (VRE) have
527 become a major concern in human and veterinary medicine and individual isolates of
528 vancomycin-resistant MRSA have also been reported.¹³²⁻¹³⁴ This group of drugs
529 should not be needed following the conditions outlined above and should be reserved
530 for human medicine.

531 Some general recommendations on duration, dosage and combination with
532 topical therapy apply for MRS infections in the same way as for MSS infections.
533 Frustratingly, good evidence for recommendations on treatment duration is sparse
534 and specific dose assessment for treatment of MRS has not been published. In the
535 absence of such data, current published advice on the duration of treatment (three
536 weeks for superficial pyoderma or one week beyond clinical resolution and four to six
537 weeks for deep pyoderma or two weeks beyond clinical resolution) should be
538 adhered to.^{17,18} The combination of systemic therapy with topical antibacterial
539 treatment is recommended whenever possible to reduce environmental
540 contamination and the risk of transmission to other hosts.

541
542

543 **Outcomes of treatment for staphylococcal infections:**

544 Veterinary case-control studies have shown that methicillin-resistant
545 staphylococcal infections do not necessarily have less favorable outcomes than
546 methicillin-susceptible infections in dogs and cats, as long as a safe antimicrobial
547 alternative is available for treatment.^{38,39,80,135} Treatment outcome of MRS infections
548 in small animals appears to depend on restoring the skin barrier function and removal

549 of implants combined with antibacterial therapy, either by topical, systemic or
550 intralesional route. However, when inserted into a highly virulent strain, extensive
551 antimicrobial resistance may greatly complicate therapeutic interventions and could
552 ultimately worsen outcome if resistance is not promptly identified and proper therapy
553 instituted.

554 Outcome of MRSA infection in comparison to MSSA infection is frequently
555 studied in human hospitals due to concern about increased mortality from drug-
556 resistance but also to assess the impact on healthcare cost. While some of the more
557 recent reports appear to document an increased risk of mortality in certain patient
558 groups with MRSA,¹³⁶ conflicting results remain, likely due to the heterogeneity of
559 MRSA infections (blood stream infections vs. skin and soft tissue infections) and
560 healthcare provision and bias from patient characteristics (age, co-morbidities). In a
561 case series of eleven dogs with MRSA surgical site or skin infection, systemic
562 antibacterial therapy based on susceptibility testing, improved or resolved the
563 infection in nine of the eleven dogs; one dog had been euthanized with radiographic
564 evidence of osteomyelitis, the other lost to follow-up.¹³⁷ In a multi-institutional
565 retrospective case-control study of 40 dogs with MRSA infection and 80 dogs with
566 MSSA infection, no significant differences in duration of hospitalization or euthanasia
567 rates were found. Most infections were limited to the skin, with no difference in body
568 tissue/organ distribution between the groups.³⁸ In a small retrospective case-control
569 study of 11 cats with MRSA and 29 cats with MSSA, no statistically significant
570 differences between groups were detected in signalment or mortality, nor subjective
571 differences in clinical signs/morbidity and response to therapy based on culture-
572 directed antimicrobial therapy.¹³⁵

573 In regards to *S. pseudintermedius*, a retrospective comparison of medical
574 records of 123 dogs with MSSP pyoderma and 93 dogs with MRSP infections
575 showed no difference between groups with regard to outcome although individual
576 MRSP infections took longer to resolve.⁸⁰ Similarly, of 12 pets with MRSP infection,
577 clinical signs resolved or markedly improved in 11 patients, again, one dog was
578 euthanized with signs of osteomyelitis after chronic otitis media.¹¹⁸

579 It may be therefore concluded, based upon these limited clinical data, that
580 MRS are generally no more virulent than MSS and not associated with a worse
581 outcome. The findings of clinical reports are compatible with the lack of genetic
582 markers for invasive behavior so far identified in staphylococci. A large microarray
583 study previously compared invasive clinical *S. aureus* isolates with nasally carried
584 strains from humans and concluded that the outcome of the patient-staphylococcal
585 relationship was strongly dependent on host factors.¹³⁸ Similarly, known *S.*
586 *pseudintermedius* toxin genes such as *siet* and *luk I* have been described in MSS
587 and MRS with no known association with specific disease or prognosis.^{139,140,141}

588 In summary, with the potential for selection, referral, and many other study
589 design biases in mind, it has to be concluded that there is little evidence for a
590 difference in outcome between MRS and MSS infections in animals and that the
591 prognosis for MRS skin infections in pets is good, depending on underlying causes.

592

593 **“Decolonization”:**

594 Once MRS infection has resolved, humans and animals can continue to carry
595 MRS at skin and mucosal sites with associated risks for the patient and others, either
596 via direct contact with the carrier or via environmental contamination.

597

598 In a medical context, the term “decolonization” is most commonly used to describe

599 the eradication of MRSA from skin and mucosal carriage sites by antimicrobial
600 treatment. Alternatively, decolonization may occur naturally if a patient loses MRSA
601 carrier status without medical intervention over time.¹⁴²
602

603 **MRSA decolonization in human medicine:**

604 The efficacy of a combination of decolonization treatment with MRSA
605 surveillance sampling, mostly prior to hospital admission, in the prevention of
606 healthcare-acquired infections was recently supported by good evidence from a
607 systematic review of 83 European studies published between 2000 and 2012.¹⁴³
608 However, decolonization remains a controversial topic in human medicine as efficacy
609 is often short-term, best protocols are not established, ethical concerns remain about
610 the use of antimicrobial agents in essentially otherwise healthy carriers and adverse
611 events and development of resistance during therapy has been reported.¹⁴⁴
612 Systematic assessment of decolonization regimes include variation in outcomes
613 assessed (e.g. negative culture at different time points, effect on bacteremia rates or
614 surgical site infections), the competing effects of additional environmental hygiene
615 interventions, differences in transmission pathways between settings and importantly,
616 the effect of MRSA prevalence on screening, isolation and decolonization.

617 A justification for decolonization is supported by the finding that 80% of *S.*
618 *aureus* bacteremia cases in humans were shown to involve genetically identical
619 isolates as those carried by the patient nasally on admission, suggesting that carried
620 strains are well adapted to their host and thus, with an advantage for proliferating to
621 infection should the opportunity arise.¹⁴⁵ Even though data on the impact of pre-
622 operative nasal MRSA carriage on post-operative MRSA infection are
623 conflicting,^{146,147} the concept is plausible that eradication of MRSA carriage can
624 reduce the risk of MRSA infection from endogenous MRSA but not the transmission
625 of MRSA through in-contact people or environmental contamination.
626

627 **Decolonization in dogs:**

628 In dogs, no studies have assessed the need or best protocols for
629 decolonization of MRS carriers. However, a small number of longitudinal studies of
630 MRSP carrier dogs are reported and similarities between human *S. aureus* carriage
631 and canine *S. pseudintermedius* carriage exist that may allow comparison and
632 possibly support or refute a case for screening and decolonization or at least
633 conclusions on hygiene recommendations.

634 Mucosal *S. pseudintermedius* carriage appears to play a similar role in canine
635 skin infection that described for *S. aureus* blood stream infection in humans.¹⁴⁵ In
636 dogs, 80% of *S. pseudintermedius* carriage isolates from mucosae were genetically
637 identical to isolates from pustules of the same dog.¹⁴⁸ For MRSP in particular, a
638 prospective multicenter study of 549 dogs showed that MRSP carriage on admission
639 predisposed to post-TPLO surgical site infection with an odds ratio of 6.72.¹⁴⁹ MRSP
640 carriage appears to be a common sequel to infection as shown through longitudinal
641 sampling after resolution of infection. In 42 dogs sampled after clinical resolution of
642 their MRSP infection, MRSP carriage was detected in 61.9% between 3 and 15
643 weeks after initial presentation³⁷ and persistence of carriage could be shown to last
644 for up to 11 months following clinical cure of infection.¹⁵⁰
645

646 **What are the risks associated with carrier dogs?**

647 MRS colonized or contaminated pets can pose a risk to susceptible in-contact
648 people and animals as staphylococci typically reside on surface sites ideally suited to

649 transmission by direct contact, e.g. licking.¹⁵¹ Staphylococci adhering to
650 corneocytes¹⁵² and can also be transmitted via indirect routes through desquamation
651 into the environment, enhanced by their ability to survive on surfaces for many
652 months.^{153,154} For MRSA, there is ample, although still indirect, evidence for
653 transmission from pets to people^{104,154-156} via either or both direct and indirect routes;
654 transmission of MRSP from pets to people has been reported less frequently.
655 However, environmental MRSP contamination was associated with the presence of
656 infected or colonized index dogs in two similar studies where MRSP-infected dogs,
657 in-contact animals and people and environmental sites were sampled over time.^{157,158}
658 The results of both studies indicated that MRSP could be easily transmitted to dogs
659 but not to people. This finding is further supported by *in vitro* adhesion tape
660 corneocyte assays which showed that *S. pseudintermedius* adhered better to canine
661 corneocytes while *S. aureus* showed preference to human squames.¹⁵²
662

663 **Natural decolonization:**

664 Natural decolonization, i.e. the loss of MRS from carriage sites without on-
665 animal treatment, occurs likely due to competition within the bacterial microflora.
666 Multidrug-resistance in a bacterial isolate improves survival chances at times of drug
667 treatment. However, this advantage fades when treatment stops and carriage or
668 expression of resistance genes becomes a metabolic burden for the multidrug-
669 resistant strain competing for its niche. Such fitness cost in exchange for drug
670 resistance has been well documented for *S. aureus* and the emergence of different
671 successful MRSA lineages over time.¹⁵⁹⁻¹⁶²

672 Evidence for natural decolonization is difficult to find though as environmental
673 contamination is closely interlinked but more difficult to assess. Carriage swabs,
674 taken at a single occasion and processed by selective culture for the MRS target
675 organism, will identify colonizing bacteria but also transient contamination of carriage
676 sites, either from the environment or contact with infected sites. Such transient
677 carriage was illustrated in an older study where human hospital nurses were sampled
678 for MRSA carriage immediately following a duty shift and of 13 carriers, 12 were
679 found negative the following morning before duty.¹⁶³

680 Natural decolonization was also demonstrated in healthy MRSA carrier dogs
681 kept in regularly cleaned environments. Ten of a total of 129 dogs at a rescue facility
682 were found positive for MRSA at mucosal and skin carriage sites while all 16
683 companions sharing a kennel with one of the carriers were negative. All carriers
684 sampled negative within two weeks. Kennels were cleaned twice and disinfected
685 once daily.¹⁶⁴ In a cross-sectional study of dogs and cats that resided with human
686 MRSA patients, the odds of MRSA isolation from “carriage” sites decreased by xx.x
687 for each day that pet sampling was delayed after the person started antimicrobial
688 therapy.³² These studies suggest that dogs do not support MRSA carriage for long
689 periods, at least in clean environments. MRSP carriage on the other hand, was
690 shown to persist for over 12 months after infection had resolved albeit in household
691 settings without special cleaning interventions.^{37,150,157}
692

693 **Would decolonization with antimicrobial agents work?:**

694 Resolution of MRS infection is a pre-requisite of decolonization as carriage
695 sites will otherwise be contaminated by pathogens. MRSP decolonization with
696 systemic therapy, even using agents to which the MRSP shows *in vitro* susceptibility,
697 is unlikely to be effective based on the persistence of MRSP carriage after successful
698 treatment and resolution of pyoderma shown in two studies.^{37,150} Decolonization

699 using topical antimicrobial agents can be effective though, at least for short periods.
700 Significant reductions in colony-forming units of *S. (pseud)intermedius* from treated
701 mucosal carriage sites and untreated cutaneous have been seen following twice daily
702 application of fusidic acid in a 1% viscous eye drop formulation.¹⁶⁵ Mucosal treatment
703 reduced bacterial counts typically from multiples of 10³ to less than 10 colony-forming
704 units per swab at two days after treatment and reduced *S. (pseud)intermedius* counts
705 were still seen three weeks after cessation of fusidic acid therapy. Provided good
706 compliance, the same effect may be expected against MRS carriage in dogs as
707 minimum inhibitory concentrations of antibacterial agents available for use in pets
708 tended to be low.

709

710 **Conclusions on decolonization:**

711 There is currently not enough evidence to recommend routine decolonization
712 of MRS carrier animals. However, MRS carrier dogs pose a risk to susceptible in-
713 contact humans and animals through direct contact and contribute to MRS
714 contamination of their environments. Natural decolonization should be supported
715 through rigorous hygiene measures, where possible combined with temporary
716 isolation to ease cleaning and disinfection. Some clinicians recommend follow-up
717 sampling of carriage sites to identify persistent carriage and the need for further
718 hygiene measures, whereas others do not due to lack of evidence to support the
719 utility of interventions. There is no evidence on when MRS carriage can be
720 considered resolved.

721

722 **Methods for establishing strain concordance in a proposed “outbreak”:**

723 Molecular characterization of staphylococcal strains is a widely-used research
724 tool that can provide information about genetic relatedness, evolutionary history,
725 virulence factors, mechanisms of antimicrobial resistance and other properties. It can
726 be used as part of molecular epidemiological investigation for various reasons, such
727 as determination of whether a group of infections are potentially linked or to
728 determine whether infections are caused by a recognized or new strain. A range of
729 methods is available and selection of methods for a particular investigation is based
730 on a combination of factors, such as availability, cost, throughput and discriminatory
731 power.^{1-5 166-170} Common methods are outlined in Table 3. As a general trend, access
732 to cheap Next Generation Sequencing (NGS) has determined a gradual shift from
733 DNA band-based methods such as PFGE to sequence-based methods such as
734 MLST and *spa* typing.

735 While typing methods are widely available, molecular characterization typically
736 provides limited clinically relevant information and typing of isolates is usually
737 reserved for rare situations such as outbreaks. Typing is an important component of
738 outbreak investigation, but even within outbreaks, the usefulness of typing may be
739 limited, depending on the organism, epidemiology, typing method(s) and investigation
740 goals. In the context of investigation of a potential outbreak, identification of different
741 strains can provide assurance that a single point-source is not present. Finding
742 indistinguishable isolates according to one or even two typing mechanisms *suggests*
743 that they *might* be linked, but this depends to a large degree on the discriminatory
744 power of the typing method. Typing alone may not be definitive,¹⁷¹ although
745 advances in typing methods, particularly whole genome sequencing, increase the
746 potential yield of molecular investigations. Whole genome sequencing currently is
747 used almost exclusively in the research setting as real-time analysis, necessary for
748 clinical application, is difficult and resource-intensive. As ease and speed of

749 sequencing and data analysis improve, this will likely become more clinically
750 applicable in the near future.

751 Some pathogens are relatively clonal, with a small number of discernible
752 strains present in a circulating area. MRSP exemplifies this situation, with a small
753 number of clones, predominating internationally and locally.^{166,167,172} Thus,
754 identification of the same strain in a group of cases from a clinic could represent a
755 true outbreak or simply the 'background' molecular makeup of MRSP in the region.
756 Typing can provide useful data, but those data must be evaluated with an
757 understanding of the typing method (e.g. what it is assessing, discriminatory power)
758 and with corresponding epidemiological data.¹⁷³ From a clinical standpoint, the
759 potential actions that would result from obtaining typing data must also be
760 considered. While it is possible that identification of a clonal outbreak of a
761 *Staphylococcus* would lead to a specific infection control intervention, this would be
762 uncommon. Most often, typing provides interesting data about the epidemiology and
763 ecology of the organism, but does not have any impact on patient- or even clinic-level
764 management. Molecular characterization is therefore typically reserved for research
765 studies. If an ongoing, large or unusual cluster of staphylococcal infections is
766 occurring within a clinic, there might be a benefit to characterization of isolates;
767 however, that should only be considered as part of a broader infection control
768 investigation, typically with the involvement of infectious disease specialists.

769 Questions often arise about characterization of isolates from animals when
770 there may be a corresponding human infection, typically involving MRSA.
771 Characterization of human and animal isolates in those situations is interesting but
772 provides little practical information. From a logistical standpoint, there can be
773 challenges in securing both human and animal isolates and having them transferred
774 to the same laboratory. This may not be required for all methods, since some (e.g.
775 spa typing) are amenable to accurate inter-laboratory comparison. However, more
776 subjective methods such as PFGE should be performed side-by-side. Even if isolates
777 are obtained and able to be tested, the relevance of the results is usually unclear. For
778 example, finding the same strain of MRSA in a person and pet is interesting, and
779 supports interspecies transmission. Yet, it is difficult to elucidate direction of
780 transmission, or even if there was transmission between those individuals.³² It is
781 possible that both human and pet could be exposed by another unknown individual
782 (human or animal) or via a shared environment. Whole genome sequencing can
783 provide important insight into some outbreaks, where subtle changes in the pathogen
784 over time can be used to elucidate potential sources and directions of transmission.
785 This is most applicable to outbreaks or high endemic infection rates that occur over
786 time.

787 **Veterinary Hospital Infection Control:**

789 There is an ever-present risk of MR staphylococcal exposure for patients and
790 humans in a veterinary hospital. As opportunistic pathogens that are not uncommonly
791 found as part of the commensal microbiota, every human or animal poses some risk
792 of introducing an MR *Staphylococcus* into the facility. Routine infection control
793 practices are the cornerstone to control of MR staphylococci. This involves a
794 collection of procedures and practices designed to reduce the risk of exposure to
795 various pathogens. "Good routine practices done consistently and well" should be the
796 emphasis. Design and implementation of an infection control program is beyond the
797 scope of this document, but some good general resources are available.¹⁷⁴⁻¹⁷⁶
798 Selected areas are briefly outlined below.

799

800 **Personal protective equipment:**

801 Personal protective equipment (PPE) is designed to protect the wearer,
802 preventing contamination of underlying skin and clothing, as well as protect patients
803 from exposure to contaminated body surfaces and clothing.¹⁷⁷ Routine personal
804 protective equipment is ideally a laboratory coat over street clothes or scrubs, as the
805 laboratory coat provides full torso and arm coverage and can be changed easily.
806 Scrubs are often worn by veterinary personnel but should not be the outer PPE layer
807 because they do not provide arm cover and are not as easy to change. When
808 possible, coats and scrubs should be laundered in hospital rather than at home to
809 reduce microbial contamination and take-home exposures.¹⁷⁸ Ties, scarves, lanyards
810 and other accessories that may become contaminated should be covered by outer
811 PPE or not worn.¹⁷⁹

812 In some situations, enhanced PPE may be required. This would include one or
813 more of the use of a gown or outerwear layer that is only used for one patient, gloves,
814 mask, eye protection or face protection.¹⁸⁰ No data exist regarding optimal PPE
815 practices for handling animals infected with MR staphylococci. However, the use of
816 some degree of enhanced precautions to reduce contamination of clothing and skin
817 is reasonable. Typically, this would consist of a gown or dedicated laboratory coat
818 and gloves. Gloves can be effective additional barriers but are often misused.¹⁸¹
819 Common errors with glove use are continuing to wear the gloves after the patient
820 contact and contaminating various surfaces, as well as failure to perform hand
821 hygiene after glove removal. Masks are occasionally used in human healthcare when
822 managing MRSA-infected patients, mainly to reduce hand-nose contact (and the
823 associated risk of becoming colonized). The same could be considered in veterinary
824 hospitals, particularly with personnel who frequently touch their face inadvertently
825 during patient care. However, masks are rarely used or indicated.

826 When to use routine versus enhanced practices has not been well defined in
827 the context of veterinary dermatology. The combination of a high prevalence of MR
828 staphylococcal infection or colonization in the caseload and frequent contact with
829 animals at increased risk of staphylococcal infection (e.g. diseases that affect the
830 normal skin barrier) presumably creates abundant risk of MR staphylococcal
831 transmission in many dermatology practices. In areas where the prevalence of MR
832 staphylococci is high, consideration should be given to enhancing routine PPE, such
833 as changing laboratory coats between patients and wearing gloves for any contact
834 with potentially infected or compromised skin.

835
836 **Hand hygiene:**

837 Hand hygiene is perhaps the simplest and least expensive infection control
838 practice, but it also tends to be poorly used.¹⁸¹ The role of hands in transmission of
839 MR staphylococci between patients or as a source of infection of personnel is
840 unknown, but probably substantial. Proper hand washing and drying¹⁸², or use of an
841 alcohol based hand sanitizer,¹⁸³ can effectively reduce staphylococcal skin
842 contamination and therefore presumably reduce the risk of MR staphylococcal
843 transmission. The actual efficacy of hand hygiene is unclear, even in human
844 medicine, because it is exceptionally difficult to differentiate the role of hands versus
845 other sources, but hand hygiene compliance is a major component of virtually any
846 infection control program.

847 Ensuring adequate numbers, accessibility and stocking (soap, paper towels) of
848 sinks can facilitate hand washing compliance; however, hand washing can be limited

849 by access to sinks, and adding or repositioning sinks is often cost-prohibitive.
850 Alcohol-based hand sanitizers can be provided to personnel and easily placed or
851 mounted throughout a facility, facilitating access to hand hygiene in all patient care
852 areas. Hand washing should be performed when there is abundant gross
853 contamination (e.g. pus) of the hands, but, otherwise, hand washing and hand
854 sanitizers are essentially interchangeable. Hand sanitizers may be less damaging to
855 the user's skin with frequent use.

856
857 **MRS patient or carrier? Isolation practices:**

858 Isolation is designed to limit direct and indirect contact between an individual
859 and other individuals, as well as the general environment. It is an effective tool for
860 reducing transmission of various pathogens, including those such as staphylococci
861 that are spread primarily by direct and indirect contact. In human medicine, contact
862 precautions are typically used with MRSA infected individuals. This usually involves
863 housing the patient in a private room, limiting visitation and using enhanced
864 protective equipment for any patient contact. In veterinary hospitals, isolation may
865 involve housing a patient in a dedicated isolation ward or using enhanced
866 precautions in a general ward. While direct and indirect transmission should be able
867 to be effectively controlled in a general ward with isolation practices, physical and
868 procedural separation (isolation unit) is presumed to be more reliable than procedural
869 separation alone. The size of the isolation unit, ability to perform patient care
870 activities in isolation, number of animals with MR-staphylococcal infections and
871 nature of the rest of the hospital caseload (e.g. presence of a large population of high
872 risk surgical cases) impact decisions on whether to house animals with MR-
873 staphylococcal infection or colonization in isolation or wards. Regardless of the
874 location, clear management policies (e.g. cleaning and disinfection, animal
875 movement, PPE) must be available.

876

877 **Cleaning and disinfection:**

878 Cleaning and disinfection are designed to reduce or eliminate pathogenic
879 burdens in the environment and on equipment.^{184,185} Routine cleaning and
880 disinfection practices are the most important part of a comprehensive program.
881 Staphylococci are readily inactivated by routine disinfectants, including those that
882 predominate in veterinary facilities (e.g. quaternary ammonium disinfectants,
883 accelerated hydrogen peroxide). However, cleaning and disinfection are two separate
884 steps, and cleaning is required for effective disinfection. Failure to properly clean a
885 surface can result in ineffective disinfection through inhibitory effects of organic
886 debris (e.g. dirt, hair, pus) and biofilm. Good cleaning will remove the majority of
887 contaminants and prepare the surface for effective disinfection. In addition to a
888 proper surface, adequate disinfection requires an appropriate concentration (dilution)
889 of the disinfectant and the proper contact time, which varies between products. Of
890 note, recontamination following cleaning is typical, which emphasizes the importance
891 for such practices to be conducted on a frequent schedule.

892 Enhanced practices are sometimes used in response to specific contamination
893 events or cases. Since MR staphylococci are susceptible to commonly used
894 disinfectants, identification of an infected patient does not necessarily mean that a
895 change in cleaning and disinfection is needed. Periodically, MR staphylococci
896 harboring genes (e.g. *norA*, *qacA/B*) that confer resistance to certain disinfectants
897 may be identified, and such situations may warrant closer examination of disinfection
898 protocols.¹⁸⁶

899 If routine cleaning and disinfection are performed properly, no additional work
900 should be needed. This emphasizes the need for a properly-designed cleaning and
901 disinfection program, with documentation of disinfectant practices (product, dilution,
902 contact time), when cleaning and disinfection must be performed, and related basic
903 information. In some situations, changes to the timing of cleaning and disinfection
904 may be indicated, such as performing this immediately after an infected patient
905 leaves the room rather than at the end of the day. Disinfection of items that are not
906 routinely disinfected might also be considered, such as clippers after use on an
907 infected patient. However, since only a potentially small percentage of animals
908 harbouring MR staphylococci are known at the time of examination, focusing cleaning
909 and disinfection (and other infection control practices) on the known cases risks
910 missing a large number of other infectious individuals. This emphasizes the
911 importance of routine, consistent general practices rather than MR staphylococcal-
912 targeted practices.

913 **Identification of infected animals:**

914 Identification of MR staphylococcal infections is important for case
915 management and infection control purposes and this can only be achieved through
916 diagnostic testing. Early identification of MR staphylococcal infections is important, so
917 diagnostic testing prior to empirical treatment is preferred, although the realities of
918 clinical practice can limit testing. Testing should be considered particularly important
919 with serious infections and infections that have not responded to empirical therapy. It
920 should also be strongly recommended in situations where a resistant pathogen is
921 more likely, such as in animals with previous MR staphylococcal infection, recent
922 antimicrobial exposure, recent hospitalization or those that live with a person or
923 animal with a history of MRSA or MRSP infection. Testing of potentially hospital-
924 associated infections is also beneficial to provide important information about
925 endemic rates and to identify clusters of infections as early as possible.

926 **Surveillance:**

927 Related to identification of infected animals is recording of data pertaining to
928 infections. Understanding endemic rates of disease is critical for accurate and prompt
929 identification of 'abnormal' rates, whether it is a gradual change in rate or a sudden
930 high-incidence outbreak.¹⁸⁷

931 The most common and practical form of surveillance in veterinary hospitals is
932 passive surveillance. This involves recording (or being able to retrieve) basic data
933 about disease incidence or characteristics (e.g. antimicrobial susceptibility profiles).
934 Understanding the typical incidence of MR staphylococcal infections can be
935 facilitated by central recording of MR staphylococcal diagnoses from routine clinical
936 activities. This can be used to generate information about the baseline/endemic rate,
937 which can be monitored over time. Changes in rates can then be investigated.
938 Antimicrobial susceptibility data can also be monitored to provide guidance for
939 empirical therapy and to detect changes that might suggest a change in the
940 epidemiology of the pathogen in the clinic or region. Use of electronic health records
941 and laboratory software programs for tracking data can enable or enhance these
942 passive surveillance activities. This can be of use for practice-specific decision
943 making, as well as provide data that can be used for broader evidence-based
944 guideline development.

945 Active surveillance is a more expensive and time consuming method that
946 involves *de novo* collection of data for infection control purposes, such as MRSA or
947
948

949 MRSP screening at the time of admission. Active surveillance is rarely used in
950 veterinary hospitals because of the cost, time commitment, relatively low burden of
951 hospital-associated MR staphylococcal infections and limited evidence of usefulness.
952 Active surveillance might be useful as a periodic surveillance tool to understand the
953 epidemiology of MR staphylococci in a clinic, or in response to an increased
954 incidence of disease or an outbreak, but such situations would be uncommon. Any
955 active surveillance should be designed with the input of a specialist to ensure that
956 useful data are obtained and that resources are effectively used.

957

958 **Community spaces**

959 Control of MR staphylococci at the community level is exceptionally
960 complicated, in part due to the overlapping human and animal epidemics and shifting
961 epidemiology on both sides. On one hand, limiting further dissemination of important
962 pathogens such as MRSA and MRSP is a laudable goal. On the other hand, if these
963 are carried by even a small percentage (e.g. <1-3%, see Table 1) of healthy
964 individuals, it becomes clear that animals with known infections constitute only a
965 fraction of the pool of potentially infectious individuals. They might pose a somewhat
966 higher risk because of higher staphylococcal burdens at infected sites; however,
967 virtually nothing is known about the relative risk of transmission from healthy versus
968 clinically infected versus recently infected individuals.

969 It would be logical to consider a few different groups in terms of risk of
970 infectivity. Individual animals at highest risk are those with active MR staphylococcal
971 SSTIs that may be shedding the organism from both the site of infection and
972 colonization sites. The next risk group would be animals with recent infections.
973 Duration of shedding has not been well defined, and appears to differ among
974 staphylococcal species and hosts. In general, it is thought that MRSA shedding is
975 relatively short-term (days to weeks) after resolution of clinical infection,¹⁸⁸⁻¹⁹⁰ while
976 MRSP shedding may be prolonged in some individuals, especially dogs.^{150,191,192} The
977 potential for long term (months to years) shedding of MRSP post-infection
978 complicates control measures since no defined period of risk can be given in the
979 absence of testing. Another group would be individuals with known risk factors for
980 MR staphylococcal carriage, such as recent antibiotic exposure, visitation of human
981 hospitals or hospitalization in a veterinary clinic.^{189,193-196} Animals in this group could
982 be highly variable, and this variability could mean that the potential risk conferred is
983 best assessed on an individual basis. Beyond these would be the 'lowest' risk
984 population, healthy animals with no hospitalization or antibiotic exposure. However,
985 even in this population, MR staphylococcal carriage is possible. Therefore, while
986 some animals likely pose greater risk than others, any community-level contact with
987 an animal is presumably associated with some (albeit low) risk of MR staphylococcal
988 exposure. Further, while the risk posed by any individual animal-animal or human-
989 animal contact is presumably low, there is an accumulating risk of MR staphylococcal
990 carriage with more contacts. More contacts, and more contact with higher-risk
991 individuals presumably increase the risk of community-based transmission. This
992 applies for virtually every other infectious disease and should not itself be taken as an
993 indication of the need for social distancing or contact isolation.

994 Determination of how to manage community risk is difficult because of a lack
995 of clear data and the subjective (and variable) determination of costs vs benefits.
996 Social aspects of animal-animal and animal-human interaction are difficult to quantify
997 but should not be ignored. Other benefits such as exercise and practical aspects of
998 boarding (day care or longer term) boarding also bear consideration. Further, it is

999 possible that animals harbor microbes or participate in microbial sharing that
1000 increases beneficial bacterial diversity for in-contact animals and humans.^{31,197}
1001 Case-by-case consideration of the costs and benefits to the individual animal, the
1002 animal's family and broader human and animal populations should be performed, as
1003 difficult as this may be.

1004 In terms of restriction of individuals conferring risk, the greatest attention
1005 should be paid to individuals with active infections, since they likely constitute the
1006 greatest risk. Restricting these individuals from contact situations (e.g. dog parks,
1007 play groups, competitions, kennels) is logical. How long to do so is unclear, as risk is
1008 presumably highest prior to the onset of treatment, with a relatively rapid decline
1009 thereafter. Considering the potential duration of treatment of staphylococcal skin
1010 infections, restrictions throughout the entire treatment period can become
1011 problematic. In lieu of data to guide recommendations, it is reasonable to restrict
1012 animals from contact situations until treatment has started and a clinical response is
1013 evident. Thereafter, some degree of elevated risk is still presumably present, perhaps
1014 more from carriage sites than the infected site. While recently infected animals or
1015 those with risk factors for carriage (e.g. recent hospitalization) likely pose additional
1016 risk, the costs of restriction may outweigh the benefits, and the presence of an
1017 unknown but not insubstantial pool of other MR staphylococcal carriers limits the
1018 benefits of restricting this small but known population. Human guidelines for
1019 management of community-associated MRSA, even in high risk environments such
1020 as childcare or sports teams, do not recommend exclusion of colonized or high risk
1021 individuals.^{197,198} Instead, they focus on covering infected sites (something that is
1022 rarely possible with skin infections in animals) and general personal and
1023 environmental hygiene practices.

1024 Correspondingly, management of particularly susceptible individuals that are
1025 at increased risk of acquisition of MR staphylococci or increased risk of progression
1026 to clinical infection given MR staphylococcal exposure is worthy of consideration. In
1027 some situations, a period of increased risk is short and defined, such as after
1028 undergoing surgery, having a wound, or being treated with an antimicrobial or short-
1029 term immunosuppressive therapy. It is easier to justify short-term restriction such as
1030 keeping dogs away from off-leash parks, playgroups or kennels during a defined and
1031 short-term period of risk, because the costs may be limited and manageable. When
1032 individuals have persistently elevated risk (e.g. uncontrolled inflammatory skin
1033 disease, chronic immunosuppressive therapy), the issue becomes more complicated.
1034 Overall, the risk of mixing in community settings is presumably low, even in high-risk
1035 individuals. Basic practices such as limiting overall dog-dog contact, trying to keep
1036 dog-dog contact to defined groups (as opposed to random encounters with a more
1037 variable population), avoiding contact with animals that may be at increased risk
1038 (something is difficult to identify but possible in some situations) and avoiding
1039 contacts during periods of heightened risk (e.g., an atopic flare) are logical but
1040 unproven.

1041

1042 **In-home mitigation:**

1043 Within the community, households have shown the greatest potential, not just
1044 as a point of transmission of relevance in a clinical context for both people and pets,
1045 but also as a potential intervention point.³³ Exchange of staphylococci between
1046 humans and pets, both in the context of recurrent disease and colonization, may be
1047 common. Humans, other companion animal household members, and home
1048 environments (including pet bedding) have been implicated in or associated with

1049 staphylococcal carriage or infection in dogs and cats.^{171,199,200} The potential for
1050 transmission of staphylococci among all human and animal members of the
1051 household, to home surfaces, and from home surfaces is accepted, although
1052 consensus has not yet been achieved regarding how frequently this occurs in the
1053 context of causation and the predominant direction(s) of transmission. Although
1054 household interventions have been minimally assessed in the literature, certain
1055 precautions deserve attention, especially if the household includes
1056 immunosuppressed patients.

1057

1058 **Hygiene and contact precautions:**

1059 Transmission of staphylococci—particularly *S. aureus*—may occur in both
1060 directions between owners and their pets; pets typically carry *S. aureus* strains
1061 genetically similar to locally dominant human clones,¹⁹⁹⁻²⁰² Similar relatedness has
1062 been identified in pets and owners that are co-colonized with *S.*
1063 *pseudintermedius*.^{199,200} Because of this potential, contact isolation strategies (e.g.
1064 crating and exclusion from the bedroom) have been recommended to segregate
1065 infected or positive pets from other pets and humans.³³ Not only may pets become
1066 carriers or colonized with staphylococci once in contact with infected or colonized
1067 people or other pets, but their fur (i.e. “petting zone”) also may become
1068 contaminated, presumably through the hand contact of owners.¹⁸⁹ This suggests an
1069 important potential role for good hand hygiene (e.g. hand washing or use of a hand
1070 sanitizer) before and after owner-pet contact, although the effectiveness of such
1071 strategies has not been formally tested.

1072

1073 **Environmental measures:**

1074 Despite a growing consensus in the literature that home environments may
1075 serve as reservoirs for staphylococci in the context of both human and animal
1076 disease, the efficacy of environmental control strategies is largely unexplored in the
1077 literature. Laundering, including on normal low-temperature settings, has been
1078 demonstrated to reduce *S. aureus* contamination of clothing in the context of hospital
1079 settings,²⁰⁴ laundering of bedding materials in household settings may be beneficial.
1080 Household disinfectants (e.g. chlorine and quaternary ammonium-based cleaners)
1081 appear to be effective in reducing *S. aureus* contamination from surfaces (reviewed
1082 by Davis et al³³). However, data from hospital settings also suggest that
1083 environmental surfaces and clothing may rapidly become re-contaminated following
1084 successful treatment.^{205,206} Hence, when animals are being treated, concurrent
1085 home cleaning may be helpful to prevent re-exposure and recurrence. In some cases
1086 of recurrence, addressing human and animal household members also may be
1087 necessary, although the human literature demonstrates that adopting a similar
1088 approach of household-wide decolonization to reduce recurrence of SSTIs in people
1089 has shown weaker benefit than anticipated.^{207,208}

1090

1091 **Screening of healthy pets and people:**

1092 Screening of healthy pets and people for carriage of selected staphylococci
1093 (e.g. MRSA or MRSP) can provide interesting information about the epidemiology of
1094 staphylococci, as well as interspecies transmission. It is also an area that can be
1095 fraught with potential problems, particularly when clear plans for how to access and
1096 use the results have not been determined and communicated prior to testing. Testing
1097 of clinically normal animals rarely leads to clear and justifiable action. Testing of
1098 humans leads to issues of confidentiality, and testing of clinic personnel (especially if

1099 not clearly voluntary and anonymous) could lead to a host of legal problems for clinic
1100 management. Testing of healthy individuals, particularly humans, should be a rare
1101 event that is based on a specific need and with a clear plan to act on the results.
1102

1103 **Testing to identify increased risk in a patient:**

1104 Using screening to inform risk profiling among patients has the greatest
1105 potential, among all potential scenarios, for widespread adoption. In humans, MRSA
1106 screening is used judiciously in certain risk groups to target specific interventions,
1107 e.g. patients admitted to the intensive care unit may be screened and MRSA-positive
1108 individuals subjected to barrier precautions. Similarly, patients scheduled for
1109 orthopedic surgeries may be prescribed decolonization treatment, although evidence
1110 of this risk and efficacy of decolonization are variable.^{209-212²⁴⁻²⁷} There is limited
1111 corresponding information in veterinary medicine. MRSP carriage has been
1112 associated with increased risk of MRSP infection following tibial plateau leveling
1113 osteotomy (TPLO) in dogs,^{213²⁸} suggesting that screening could be considered in
1114 this population and susceptibility results used to guide peri-operative antimicrobial
1115 drug administration for MRSP carriers. However, the potential clinical impact of
1116 screening has not been investigated and there is limited evidence to identify other
1117 high-risk situations that would be accompanied by a potential intervention. As more
1118 evidence about risk groups, rapid screening methods and studies of interventions
1119 become available, there may be broader use of targeted screening for select, high-
1120 risk patients. Currently, the evidence for potential benefit from screening programs is
1121 strongest for surgical patients and most limited for dermatology patients.
1122

1123 **Testing to identify potential personnel sources of an outbreak:**

1124 Screening of personnel has been performed in veterinary clinic or farm MRSA
1125 outbreaks.^{214,215} However, these investigations were more focused on understanding
1126 the epidemiology of MRSA as it emerged in animals rather than as a tool to identify
1127 and mitigate an infectious focus. Veterinary personnel are known to be at elevated
1128 risk of MRSA and MRSP carriage in the absence of outbreaks,²¹⁶⁻²²¹ and screening
1129 results are difficult to interpret in the midst of an outbreak. Finding MRSA or MRSP in
1130 personnel could indicate that they were a source of infection, but it could equally
1131 indicate they were infected by a patient or coworker, were exposed to a contaminated
1132 environment, or were exposed to an unrelated strain outside the hospital setting.
1133 Removal of colonized veterinary personnel from patient care duties is not
1134 recommended, and attempts to do so could lead to management or even legal
1135 challenges for the clinic. Given the importance of good personal hygiene and routine
1136 infection control practices at all times (not just during outbreak settings), knowing an
1137 individual's status is likely to change a hospital-level approach to infectious disease
1138 management. The exception might be in a situation where there is clear evidence of
1139 a hospital focus and enhanced control measures have failed to contain the problem.
1140 Even then, the confidentiality issues associated with testing and management of a
1141 colonized individual complicate testing decisions.
1142

1143 **Testing of humans after contact with an infected animal:**

1144 Owners periodically raise concerns about their personal exposures to MR
1145 staphylococci and request testing for themselves or their families. Any testing would
1146 have to be done within the human healthcare system, and discussions of this would
1147 be between the individual and their physician. Although the veterinarian could—and
1148 arguably should, if indicated—be an integral part of a one health approach to

1149 household-wide interventions, the owner would need to actively involve the
1150 veterinarian given privacy laws protecting human health information in many
1151 countries. Regardless, consideration of how the results would be handled is
1152 important. Without highly discriminatory methods such as whole genome sequencing,
1153 combined with repeated sample collection from all individuals over time, standard
1154 microbial culture cannot be used to determine if the pet has infected people. If a pet
1155 had an MRSA infection and the owner was subsequently identified as colonized, a
1156 positive culture would not differentiate pet-to-human transmission from the more
1157 likely human-to-pet scenario. Indeed, genetic testing of animal isolates has implicated
1158 the human MRSA epidemic of spilling over into the pet population.²⁰¹ Testing of a
1159 person would only be of relevance in a situation where knowing their MRSA status
1160 would impact their medical care, e.g. before the owner would undergo elective
1161 surgery or if the owner was particularly susceptible due to a medical condition.
1162 Routine decolonization of healthy individuals in the community is rarely indicated,
1163 being restricted mainly to situations where there are recurrent infections in an
1164 individual or ongoing transmission in a household that is not responsive to other
1165 control measures.¹⁹⁹ With that approach, there would typically be no relevant impact
1166 of testing owners of MRSA-infected pets.

1167

1168 **Testing of pets of owners who have been diagnosed with an MRSA and other**
1169 **MRS infections:**

1170 Requests to test pets of infected owners—particularly when an owner has a
1171 MRSA infection—is not uncommon, and must be approached with the question
1172 ‘why’? MRSA carriage can be identified in pets of infected owners,^{32, 222} but that
1173 provides limited useful information for management of MRSA in a household. The
1174 vast majority of human MRSA infections are human associated, with exceptions for
1175 certain regions, communities, or occupations where livestock- or equine-associated
1176 MRSA may be a consideration in people. Thus, finding MRSA in the pet could
1177 represent pet-human transmission, but more likely represents human-pet
1178 transmission. Since MRSA carriage tends to be short-term in pets^{32, 188-190,} and there
1179 is no evidence that active decolonization is useful or effective in pets, finding an
1180 MRSA positive pet in such a household would typically lead to a recommendation to
1181 focus on personal hygiene and temporary contact isolation to reduce the risk of
1182 transmission of MRSA in both directions. Further, no screening test is 100% effective;
1183 screening the most sensitive site, the mouth, was shown to miss up to a third of
1184 animals with CoPS and almost 10% of cats with *S. aureus*.²³ If the animal was
1185 MRSA-negative, the recommendations would be the same, with a focus on hygiene
1186 to reduce the risk of human-pet transmission.

1187 Pet screening could be considered in the context of a broader household
1188 approach to recurrent MRSA infections in people, alongside testing or treatment of all
1189 human household members,¹⁹⁸ but only if there is a specific plan for the pet results
1190 (e.g. short-term removal from the household to allow the positive pet to naturally
1191 eliminate MRSA while the humans are being treated, and in extreme situations, with
1192 re-testing prior to re-entry into the home after people and environmental reservoirs
1193 also have been shown to be negative). It is possible that, if owners are diagnosed
1194 instead with MRSP, MRSS or another MRS known to be linked to companion
1195 animals, that pet screening may be indicated in these rare situations.

1196

1197

1198

1199 **Testing of animals that partake in human hospital visitation programs:**
1200 While dogs that visit human hospitals are known to have an elevated risk of
1201 MRSA carriage,¹⁸⁹ current guidelines for these programs do not recommend MRSA
1202 screening.^{223,224} Screening for other MR staphylococci is also not recommended.
1203 Good hygiene practices during visitation visits, including but not limited to hand
1204 washing by participants *before* and *after* the assistance animal visit, is essential.
1205

1206 **Screening of animals in households with high-risk humans:**
1207 A relatively large percentage of pets reside in households with individuals who
1208 are at increased risk of disease because of age (very young or old),
1209 immunosuppressive disorders or treatments, or pregnancy.²²⁵ As awareness of
1210 zoonotic infections increases, owners or physicians occasionally inquire about MRSA
1211 (or less commonly MRSP) screening of pets in households such as these. However,
1212 screening in situations like this is difficult to justify for many reasons. One is that MR
1213 staphylococci are not the only relevant (or potentially even the most relevant)
1214 zoonotic pathogens that might be shed by a healthy animal. Screening for MR
1215 staphylococci while ignoring other opportunistic pathogens is illogical. Further,
1216 screening only provides point-in-time information, and an animal that is negative
1217 could become exposed any time after testing. Testing is also not likely 100%
1218 sensitive. As is discussed above, given the absence of evidence that decolonization
1219 therapy would be indicated or effective, the main recommendations for an animal
1220 colonized with MR staphylococci would be an emphasis on hygiene practices, such
1221 as avoiding contact with typical colonization sites and paying close attention to
1222 hygiene practices (especially hand hygiene). In a household with high-risk
1223 individuals, those same recommendations would be made for animals that were not
1224 colonized because of concerns about exposure to a wide range of other pathogens.
1225 Therefore, since the outcome of a positive or negative result would essentially be the
1226 same, screening provides little to no benefits.
1227

1228 **Conclusions:**

1229
1230 There are many areas of concern identified within this document for which insufficient
1231 evidence is available to draw definitive conclusions about the management and
1232 prevention of MRS infection, colonization, and transmission. Therefore, the
1233 recommendations made herein are by consensus of the authors, following careful
1234 consideration of the current literature. It is the hope of the authors that this review
1235 has helped to reveal the gaps in the veterinary profession's collective knowledge
1236 base regarding MRS. In doing so, it has been our intention to stimulate collaborative
1237 dialogue and encourage investigators to pursue the types of studies that will inform
1238 more definitive guidelines and recommendations in the future.

Table 1. Recent epidemiologic studies evaluating prevalence of carriage of *S. aureus*, *S. pseudintermedius* and *S. schleiferi* in dogs and cats.

Sample Population	Study Design	Number of pets	<i>S. aureus</i>		<i>S. pseudintermedius</i>		<i>S. schleiferi</i>		Reference
			MSSA	MRSA	MSSP	MRSP	MSSS	MRSS	
Veterinary clinical populations									
University vet hospital (USA)	Case-control	48 50 cats ^a	27% 16%	2% 4%	23% 23%	0% 4%	0% 2%	2% 0%	Abraham 2007
University vet hospital (USA)	Case-control	59 50 dogs ^a	7% 12%	2% 0%	81% 64%	7% 2%	17% 2%	3% 2%	Griffeth 2008
University vet hospital (Canada)	Cross-sectional	193 dogs	-	0.5%	-	2%	-	0.5%	Hanselman 2008
University vet hospital (Canada)	Case-control	173 41 dogs ^a	-	6.4% 0%	-	34% 0%	-	4% 0%	Beck 2012
Veterinary practices (Poland)	Cross-sectional	172 dogs	5.8%	0%	41%	0%	0%	0%	Garbacz 2012
Veterinary practice (Germany)	Cross-sectional	1 dog 9 cats	-	0% 22%	-	0%	-	0%	Wei 2013
University vet hospital (Thailand)	Cross-sectional	100 dogs	3%	1%	55%	45%	12%	17%	Chanchaithong 2014
Veterinary practices (USA)	Cross-sectional	276 dogs or cats	4%	0%	1%	0%	0%	0%	Davis JA 2014
Veterinary practices (Korea)	Cross-sectional	30 dogs ^e	67%	0%	-	0%	-	-	Jang 2014
Veterinary practices (UK)	Cross-sectional	724 dogs	6.5%	1%	11%	0%	-	-	Wedley 2014
Veterinary practices (Lithuania)	Cross-sectional	345 dogs ^e 40 cats	-	0% 0%	-	1.4% 7.5%	-	0% 0%	Ruzauskas 2015
Human exposed pet populations									
Pet-owning households (Canada)	Cross-sectional	132 dogs 161 cats ^b	14% 4.3%	1.5% 0%	42% 6%	5% 1%	0.8% 0%	0% 0%	Hanselman 2009
Therapy pets visiting long-term care (Canada)	Longitudinal	96 98 dogs ^a	-	7% 2%	-	0% 1%	-	0% 0%	Lefebvre 2009
Pets of veterinary dermatologists (USA & Canada)	Cross-sectional	258 dogs 160 cats ^b	-	0.8% 3.8%	-	6.2% 3.1%	-	0.8% 0%	Morris 2010
Dog show (Germany)	Cross-sectional	108 dogs	1.8%	0%	14%	0%	0.9%	0%	Walther 2012
Healthy pets (Spain)	Cross-sectional	54 dogs 12 cats ^b	9.3% 25%	0% 0%	23.2% 8.3%	3.7% 0%	-	-	Gomez-Sanz 2012
Shelter dogs (Spain)	Cross-sectional	98 dogs	24%	0%	16%	8%	1%	0%	Gomez-Sanz 2013
Pets and shelter dogs (USA)	Cross-sectional	123 dogs	-	0%	-	1.6%	-	0%	Mouney 2013
Pets of MRSA-infected owners (USA)	Longitudinal	71 dogs 63 cats ^b	43% 14% ^c	6% 5%	79% 14% ^c	1% 0%	1% 0% ^{c,d}	0% 0% ^d	Iverson 2015

^aGiven as Case *n* or % | Control *n* or %; ^bGiven as Dog *n* or % | Cat *n* or %

^cMSSA & MSSP prevalence rates estimated from a subset of 28 animals; some of these data have not previously been published

^d*S. schleiferi* subspecies coagulans only; ^eShelter or kennel dogs also tested, results not summarized here

These papers are limited to those studies testing for multiple staphylococcal species, and do not include studies targeting just *S. aureus*, *S. pseudintermedius*, or *S. schleiferi*

Table 2: Second tier antimicrobial drugs not widely approved in many countries that may be considered for systemic treatment of MRS pyoderma in dogs after susceptibility testing.

DOGS	WHO classification
Chloramphenicol	HI
Doxycycline	HI
Minocycline	HI
Tetracycline	HI
Amikacin	CIA
Gentamicin	CIA
Tobramycin	CIA
Netilmicin	CIA
Rifampicin	CIA

HI: Highly important antimicrobial for human medicine^{WHO 2011}

CIA: Critically important antimicrobial for human medicine^{WHO 2011}

Table 3: Comparisons among common molecular typing methods for discrimination of MRS

Method	Inter-laboratory comparison	Throughput	Discriminatory power	Comment
Pulsed field gel electrophoresis (PFGE)	Moderate/low?	Moderate	Excellent	Common method but limited by inter-laboratory variation. Good for within-lab comparison of isolates or when reference stains are available.
Spa typing	Excellent	High	Variable (Species dependent)	Widely used tool for routine typing of <i>S aureus</i> . Less useful for <i>S. pseudintermedius</i> .
Multi-locus sequence typing (MLST)	Excellent	Moderate	Moderate	Good for evolutionary studies and broad comparisons. Not available for MRSS.
Dru typing	Excellent	High	Good	Can only be performed on MR staphylococci.
SCCmec typing	Moderate	Moderate	Low	Limited discriminative power. Good for broad characterization of types and evolutionary studies. Not useful for outbreak investigation. Can only be performed on MR staphylococci.
Whole genome sequencing	Excellent	Low	Excellent	Ultimate method that will become the standard as costs and analytical challenges decrease. It can be used to perform any other sequence-based method listed in this table.

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